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Abstract: Green loans are a way of financing green innovation. Two important factors, the lending 
interest rate and the loaning scale, should be focused on. In this paper, we explore the impact of 
lending interest rates and loaning scale on green innovation. We show that the incentive of green 
innovation strongly depends on the lending interest rate and the loaning scale through model 
analysis. Moreover, the dependence is summarized as a two-step strategy. In the first step, the 
lending interest rate should be lower than some rate thresholds given in the paper. Otherwise, green 
innovation fails to be stimulated. In the second step, if the lending interest rate is lower than the 
given rate threshold, then the practical loaning scale should lie between two thresholds of loaning 
scale derived in the paper, such that the green innovation will be stimulated. What is more, to 
guarantee the green effect of the innovation on the environment, we construct a threshold of loaning 
scale. If the loaning scale is larger than this threshold, then the innovation will show green effect on 
the environment. Otherwise, green innovation loses its environmental significance. The government 
stimulates green innovation through government subsidy. In this paper, we consider three kinds of 
government subsidy, including a subsidy for the bank, subsidy for the enterprise before and after 
implementing green innovation. Some appropriate government subsidy scales are presented. 
Keywords: lending interest rate; loaning scale; government subsidy; green innovation; green 
finance 
 
1. Introduction 
For the purpose of environmental protection and sustainable development, green innovation 
has been gained worldwide attention. Zisopoulou et al. [1] pointed out that green economic growth 
is involved in the framework of WEF Nexus (Water, Energy, and Food Nexus) and Aghion et al. [2] 
claimed that no green growth is possible without innovation. Abernathy and Clark [3] developed a 
framework for analyzing the competitive implications of innovation. A diagrammatic topology of 
innovation is found in their work as Figure 1. Diamond Jr [4] introduced the Schumpeter ‘creative 
destruction’ nature of innovation by a review of evidence. A relatively pragmatic definition of green 
innovation given by Driessen and Hillebrand [5] explains that green innovation should produce 
significant environmental benefits. Another definition of green innovation, given by Chen et al. [6], 
consider it as hardware and software innovation relevant to green products. Technical innovation 
involving in energy saving, pollution prevention, waste recycling, design for green products, and 
environmental management are all essential parts of green innovation. As shown by Schiederig et al. 
[7], green innovation management is getting more and more important in both practice and academic 
research in the past several years. The shortage of resources allows us to consider more on the 
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construction of green innovation and promotion of green innovation performance since they play 
key roles in sustainable development. For instance, Chang and Chen [8] explored the positive effect 
of green organizational identity on green innovation performance. Besides, they verified that both 
environmental commitment and environmental organizational legitimacy mediate between green 
organizational identity and green innovation performance. From the strategic management 
perspective, green innovation allows the industries, banks, and governments to coordinate 
development with each other. These facts drive us focusing on the study of green innovation. Works 
by Dutz and Sharma [9], Janicke [10], Lewis [11] show in the open economy, green innovation of a 
country or an industry is increasingly influenced by the external environment, especially the 
performance of banks and governments. 
 
Figure 1. The diagrammatic topology of innovation implication in Abernathy and Clark [3]. 
Much literature concentrates on financial resource influence on innovation development. 
Aghion et al. [12] investigated whether financing choices differ systematically with R&D intensity 
and found a nonlinear relationship between R&D intensity and debt/asset ratio. Bartoloni [13] offered 
a twofold contribution to the empirical debate on the financing of innovation, the causality, and 
determinants. The results support the pecking order theory, as well as the existence of credit 
constraints, which seem to affect small innovative firms when compared with larger enterprises. 
Magri [14] shed light on special features in financial structure of small innovative firms and showed 
that small innovators rely less on financial debts and more on internal financial resources. Another 
finding is that small innovative firms show a lower investment sensitivity to cash flow. O'Brien [15] 
supported that financial slack should be a particularly critical strategic imperative for firms pursuing 
a competitive strategy premised on innovation. Schäfer et al. [16] investigated whether young, small 
and medium-sized enterprises classified as innovative firms, favor equity financing, and explored 
the factors determining their choices of financing mode. Del Río et al. [17] built a framework to 
incorporate the impact of firm internal factors such as resources, capabilities and competencies, and 
their interactions with external drivers on the development and adoption of eco-innovation. Marín-
Vinuesa et al. [18] contributed empirically to the understanding of the impact that eco-innovation has 
on financial performance within the framework of the resource-based view. This literature focus on 
the relationship between capital structure and innovation performance. Some authors like Coad et al. 
[19] and D’Este et al. [20] investigated the barriers to innovation. The work of Coad et al. [19] 
contributes to the literature on barriers to innovation by accounting for heterogeneous effects that 
each barrier has on firms across the productivity distribution. D’Este et al. [20] argued that it is 
necessary to distinguish two kinds of barriers to innovation, revealed barriers and deterring barriers. 
For green innovation, in this paper, the authors focus on the effect of the specific financing 
resource, the green loan, on the innovation performance. Some works, for example, by Benfratelloe 
et al. [21], Brown et al. [22], Kenney [23], Qamruzzaman and Wei [24] have shown that external 
financing, where banks play key roles, has a major impact on technical activities of enterprises. Small 
and medium-sized enterprises are usually with weak financial strength. Green loans provide them 
start-up funds of green innovation so that they are more competitive with peer companies. 
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Benfratelloe et al. [21] verified that the process innovation can be affected by banking development, 
particularly for high-tech companies and those depending more on external finance. Concentrating 
on a provincial and industry-level innovation data set and regional lending structure in China’s credit 
market from 1999 to 2007, Xin et al. [25] found that the level of innovation has been improved by 
bank loans. Works Hawkins and Kuang [26], Hsu et al. [27] showed that more external financing 
dependent or a more high-tech intensive industry tends to exhibit a disproportionately higher 
innovation level in countries with better-developed equity markets. The work of Amore et al. [28] 
shows that banking development plays an important role in technical progress and deregulation 
admits a significantly positive impact on quantity and quality of innovation activity. Kim and Park 
[29] pointed out that financial development leads to a reduction of CO2 emission by addressing the 
role of the financial market in deploying renewable energy. Later, Nanda and Nicholas [30], Zhuang 
[31] show the positive correlation between green loans and the innovation of enterprises. 
Most existing literature on green loans concentrates on the influence of banking development 
and financial performance on green production and green innovation. Few pieces of literature care 
for quantitative analysis of green loans, particularly the role played by the loaning scale. Li et al. [32] 
started to explore problems relevant to loaning scales in their work. Enterprises are considered as 
principal objects in green innovation activities, where enterprises showed that the loaning scale is a 
crucial factor to stimulate green innovation by constructing series game models. By analyzing the 
profit of the enterprise through green innovation, they derived the loaning scale-dependent condition 
to stimulate green innovation. Besides, they obtained a threshold of the green loaning scale, which 
determines the green effect of the innovation project. Subsequently, following the work of Li et al. 
[32], Huang et al. [33] improved their results by considering the case that the success of green 
innovation also depends on the green loaning scale. They assumed that the larger capital input would 
enhance the success possibility of the green innovation project. Actually, this hypothesis is consistent 
with practice. In addition to similar results of Li et al. [32], they obtained a threshold of the green 
lending interest rate, which provides a reference when stimulating green innovation.  
Energy consumption plays an important role in industrial production. The inefficient energy 
consumption is the main origin of environmental pollution, as some hazardous substances will be let 
out into the environment. Improving the energy efficiency by technology input, as a green technical 
innovation project, is an effective approach to reduce emission of hazardous substances. Thus, 
motivated by the works of Li et al. [32] and Huang et al. [33], in this paper, the authors devote to the 
further study on appropriate loaning scales and interest rates for green innovation projects to 
improve the energy efficiency. Comparing with the works of Li et al. [32] and Huang et al. [33], the 
promotion of the current paper is summarized as follows. Firstly, the authors introduce the initial 
fund demand for the innovation project. As long as the investment exceeds this fund demand, the 
green innovation will take effect. This part of capital is thought as the acquisition cost of basic 
equipment. Secondly, the improved energy efficiency through green innovation, depending on the 
green loaning scale, is set to be a hyperbolic type rather than an exponential type as that by Li et al. 
[32] and Huang et al. [33]. This modification will not lead to any robust problems in the model. With 
the hyperbolic typesetting for improved energy efficiency, the authors present explicit formulas for 
some specific loaning scales in green innovation. Explicit formulas for important quantities in 
engineering problems are usually preferred since it is convenient to apply and analyze the theoretical 
results. Thirdly, a uniform threshold of lending interest rate is shown independent of the loaning 
scale, which is different from that in Huang et al. [33] in which the threshold of lending interest rate 
depends on the loaning scale. In general, the loaning scale was found to be negatively related to 
interest spread [34]. Thus, the threshold of lending interest rate provides a meaningful reference for 
decision on the green loan and is more appropriate to be uniform with respect to the loaning scale. 
Fourthly, the incentive of green innovation depends on both the interest rate and the scale of the 
green loan. Moreover, dependence admits an order. The incentive first depends on the lending 
interest rate. If the lending interest rate is lower than the threshold, then the incentive depends on the 
loaning scale. The green innovation way considered in this paper also belongs to environmental 
innovation. Ghisetti and Rennings [35] separated the environmental innovation into two categories, 
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those that reduce negative externalities and those targeting efficiency increases and cost savings. We 
claim that this paper targets both these categories. 
Following the work of Huang et al. [33], to look at the stimulation of green innovation, the 
authors introduce the role of government into the game. The government subsidy is considered as an 
approach to stimulate green innovation projects. In reality, government subsidies are the result of 
bilateral Pigouvian taxation [36]. Governments have a social responsibility in environmental 
protection and sustainable development. Governments can encourage enterprises to transform from 
high-level consumption and high-pollution process flows to sustainable green innovative mode 
through regulatory and incentive measures. To accelerate the development of green innovation 
system and improve the quantity and quality of green innovation, enhancement of intensity and 
range of government subsidies are necessary. Paramati et al. [37] showed that governments and 
policymakers of emerging markets should provide favorable incentives to encourage green 
innovations. Berrone et al. [38] believed that regulation pressure shows a positive influence on green 
innovation of enterprises. Monasterolo and Raberto [39] showed the promotion of green growth by 
green public policies in a way of developing the EIRIN flow-of-funds behavioral model to simulate 
the introduction of green fiscal policies. Gerlach and Zheng [40] believed that the benefits of 
providing green production and effective incentives for the business are the two things to weigh in 
incentive management. Van Leeuwen and Mohnen [41] showed that environmental regulation has 
contribution to ecological investment and ecological innovation. As shown by Acemoglu et al. [42], 
Chen and Nie [43], Dzonzi-Undi and Li [44], subsidy provided by governments can promote the 
development of green innovation and alleviate environmental pressure directly for enterprises. Thus, 
enterprises are willing to conduct green innovation with reduced costs because of subsidies. Wang et 
al. [45] pointed out that the intention of enterprises to conduct innovation can be improved by a green 
insurance subsidy and government subsidy. Kemfert and Schmalz [46] illustrated that energy-
intensive industries with poor production structure will be restrained by green loan policies. Tsai and 
Liao [47] showed that a high level of government subsidy will encourage enterprises to improve the 
ecological quality by applying environmental strategies. In the setting of this paper, the government 
provides subsidies for enterprises that apply for loan to perform green innovation. Huang et al. [33] 
claimed that government subsidy is indeed an effective approach to stimulate green innovation and 
green production, but they did not provide any information on the subsidy scale. The problem 
relevant to appropriate government subsidy scales is addressed in the current paper. Meanwhile, 
three kinds of government subsidy are considered, including a subsidy for the bank which issues 
green loans, subsidy for the enterprise before implementing green innovation, and subsidy for the 
enterprise after implementing green innovation. Thus, this section is also a further exploration of the 
results in the work of Huang et al. [33].  
The methodology used in this paper is from game theory. Game theory has been widely used to 
discuss decisions between governments and enterprises in environmental protection. Huang et al. 
[48] investigated the influences of projects such as product design, supplier selection, transportation 
modes and pricing strategies on profit and greenhouse gas emission by game models. Tian et al. [49] 
analyzed the interest relation among the government, enterprises, and consumers by dynamic game 
theory, which interprets that subsidy is benefic to the diffusion of green supply chain management. 
Hafezalkotob et al. [50] considered the influences of environmental policies on green production and 
supply chains by multi-level game methods. They pointed that the government can reduce negative 
impacts of supply chains on the environment and encourage green production through tax and 
subsidy. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose some baseline models, 
including the environmental effect of the enterprise through green innovation, the energy efficiency 
of the enterprise depending on the green loaning scale, and the profit functions of the enterprise after 
green innovation with and without government subsidy. Enterprises are the most primary 
participants in green innovation activities. Green innovation should improve the environmental 
effect and increase the profits of enterprises. In Section 3, a threshold of the lending interest rate and 
three thresholds of the green loaning scales are derived. The threshold of the lending interest rate 
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generates a precondition to stimulate green innovation. If the lending interest rate is lower than this 
threshold, then the incentive of green innovation depends on the loaning scale, which is subject to 
the thresholds. The green effect of the innovation project is also determined by the loaning scale. As 
long as the loaning scale is lower than some threshold, the innovation project will show its green 
effect. In Section 4, we focus on the government subsidy scales. Huang et al. [33] prove that 
government subsidy is an effective approach to stimulate green innovation. The following problem 
addressed in this paper is the determination of appropriate government subsidy scales. In Section 5, 
we give a conclusion and some suggestions. 
2. Baseline Models 
We consider a representative enterprise in the market. We construct the models under free 
competition and assume that the industry is energy-intensive and depends heavily on energy 
consumption. We fix other inputs since we focus on the energy input and the environmental effect of 
energy usage in the production process. We denote the energy input M . The output of the enterprise 
in the production is given as 
Q Mκθ=  
where θ  is the energy efficiency, which depicts the percent conversion of unit energy, satisfying 
0 1θ< < . κ  is the production efficiency, which depicts the output of a unit input, satisfying 1κ > . In 
this way, according to Huang et al. [33], define a measure to capture the environmental effect made 
by the enterprise in the production as 
( )1E Mθ= −  (1) 
The measure (1) is interpreted as the inefficient usage of energy. The energy emission is 
proportional to the inefficient usage of the energy and leads to environmental problems, except for 
green inputs such as wind and solar power. For instance, the emission of CO2 from producing 
activities leads to global warming. Since / 0E Mθ∂ ∂ =− <  and / 1 0E M θ∂ ∂ = − > , low energy 
efficiency and high energy input lead to poor environmental effects. Although reducing the energy 
input and the production scale may be benefit to the environment, it does not contribute to the 
economic development. Technical innovation to improve energy efficiency is an effective approach. 
Banks provide financial support to companies to conduct technical innovations and they are 
encouraged to issue green loans for environmentally friendly projects. Denote Lθ  the improved 
energy efficiency after the enterprise implements technical innovation with loaning scale L . The unit 
of the loaning scale can be thought as thousand dollars of hundred dollars. It depends on the practical 
applications of the model. The parameter 0θ  represents the original energy efficiency before 
technical innovation. The improved energy efficiency depends heavily on the loaning scale. In this 
paper, the relation between energy efficiency and the loaning scale is supposed to satisfy the 
following formula 
0Lθ θ=  as 0L L≤ , 
( )( )
( )( )
0 0
0 0 0
1
1 1L
L L
L L
θ γ
θ
θ θ γ
+ −
=
− + + −
 as 0L L>  (2) 
The parameter γ  represents the technical maturity. The energy efficiency can be improved with 
a low cost in the innovation process if the enterprise possesses a high technical maturity. The 
enterprise with a high technical maturity can achieve an expected level of energy efficiency by 
technical innovation with a relatively small loaning scale. The parameter 0L  is interpreted as the 
threshold effect of capital input in technical innovation. The energy efficiency cannot be improved 
through technical innovation until the capital input exceeds the threshold 0L . This capital input is 
considered as the acquisition cost of initial equipment. The setting of the improved energy efficiency 
(2) seems ad hoc. Actually, it is motivated by the logistic form, as seen in Dafermos et al. [51]. Since 
we focus on the effect of loaning scales in the green innovation project, the loaning scale should be a 
variable influencing the improvement of energy efficiency through technological innovation. In 
Energies 2019, 12, 4431 6 of 22 
 
general, the improved energy efficiency depending on the loaning scale should be increasing with 
respect to the loaning scale. Meanwhile, with the investment increases, the improvement of energy 
efficiency will encounter a choke point, namely that if the energy efficiency has been at a high level, 
then even though a sufficiently large investment cannot lead to a remarkable improvement. We claim 
that the logistic form setting for improved energy efficiency can well capture these characteristics. 
One can see this from the marginal change of Lθ  with respect to the loaning scale L  
( )
( )( )( )
0 0
2
0 0 0
1
1 1
L
L L L
γθ θθ
θ θ γ
−∂
=
∂
− + + −
 
It is easy to see that / 0L Lθ∂ ∂ >  and / 0L Lθ∂ ∂ →  as L → ∞ , meaning the existence of 
chokepoint with a sufficiently large capital input in the innovation project. A similar setting for 
energy efficiency of an energy-intensive enterprise depending on investment can refer to Wang et al. 
[45]. We emphasize that the improved energy efficiency will play a key role in the decision on the 
green loaning scales. Figure 2 shows the shapes of the energy efficiency Lθ  depending on the loaning 
scale L  with different values of the technical maturity γ . The threshold of initial capital input 0L  
is set to be 0 100L =  and the initial energy efficiency 0θ  is set to be 0 0.2θ = . From the figure, we can 
see that for the same loaning scale, enterprise with high technical maturity can achieve a better result 
of technical innovation than an enterprise with low technical maturity. For instance, we suppose that 
the capital input for technical innovation is given as 2 0 0L = . When the technical maturity 0.05γ =
, then 200 0.5998θ = . When 0.5γ = , then 200 0.9272θ = . 
 
Figure 2. The tendencies of energy efficiency Lθ  depending on the loaning scale L  with different 
values of technical maturity γ . The red line depicts the energy efficiency with the technical maturity 
0.01γ = . The blue line depicts the energy efficiency with the technical maturity 0.05γ = . The 
green line depicts the energy efficiency with the technical maturity 0.1γ = . The black line depicts 
the energy efficiency with the technical maturity 0.5γ = . 
Remark 1. The setting of the improved energy efficiency (2) is motivated by the logistic form, but 
where the exponential part ( )( )0exp L Lγ −  in the logistic form is substituted by a linear part 
( )01 L Lγ+ − . The improved energy efficiency should be increasing and concave with respect to the 
loaning scale, which implies the choke point of technical promotion. The logistic form can satisfy 
these characteristics. Then a problem may arise, asking why we give up the use of the exponential 
part in the logistic form, because, with the linear part, some explicit formulas of the important 
quantities including the lending interest rate, green loaning scales, and government subsidy scales in 
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the technical innovation process can be derived, which can be seen in the following sections. 
However, with the exponent part, we fail to solve the explicit formulas. In general, explicit solutions 
are usually preferred in some practical settings and engineering problems, since an explicit formula 
can show clear relations between objective variables and model parameters. Then it is conducive to 
understand the marginal changes of the objective variables with respect to the model parameters and 
put forward some effective control strategies for decision-makers. Meanwhile, we claim that the 
substitute of the exponent part by the linear part in the logistic form will not bring essential influence. 
It will not cause any additional trouble in the robust of the model. In addition, the parameter γ  in 
(2), meaning the technical maturity, is considered in the abstract. One can refer to Accenture [52] for 
a suitable definition tailored to innovation. 
Technical innovation is an effective approach to reduce energy emission and improve 
environmental quality. The enterprise is encouraged to implement technical innovation with green 
loans. However, the enterprise pursues profit and focuses on whether technical innovation could 
bring higher profit. Thus, to stimulate the technical innovation project, we need to consider the profit 
function of the enterprise. Denote ρ  the unit price of the final product in the production. Then 
according to Huang et al. [33], the enterprise can earn a return as 
R Q Mρ ρκθ= =  
Since we focus our attention on the energy input and fix other inputs, the cost function in the 
production is supposed to depend only on the energy input. Apparently, the cost is proportional to 
the input, namely that the larger input leads to a higher cost. Meanwhile, as the input increases, the 
marginal cost with respect to the input increases as well. Thus, the cost function should be increasing 
and convex with respect to the energy input. Accordingly, a quadratic polynomial is selected to 
capture the shape of the cost function, written as 
2
0C C M Mα β= + +  
where 0C  is the fixed cost Mα  is the cost for energy input and 2Mβ  represents the cost incurred 
by production [45]. The enterprise needs to consider the profits before and after technical innovation 
and then make a decision on the innovation project. If the enterprise carries out conventional 
production, it will get a profit 
2
0R C M M M Cπ ρκθ α β= − = − − −  (3) 
If the enterprise decides to implement the technical innovation by applying for a green loan from 
the bank, then the energy efficiency is improved from 0θ  to Lθ  with the capital support. Meanwhile, 
the enterprise pays the loaning interest to the bank. Thus, through technical innovation, the enterprise 
will get a profit 
2
0L LM M M C rLπ ρκθ α β= − − − −  (4) 
where r  is the green lending interest rate. The improvement of energy efficiency can stimulate 
energy input and bring a higher return to the enterprise. Meanwhile, more energy input, as well as 
the lending interest, leads to higher cost of the enterprise. This implies that technical innovation does 
not always bring a higher profit. The increase in profit depends heavily on the loaning scale. We 
believe that there should exist some loaning scales such that the profit with conventional production 
equals the profit with innovation, namely that = Lπ π . These significant scales, which mean a zero 
profit through technical innovation, are thought of as boundaries separating two cases Lπ π<  and 
Lπ π> . The case Lπ π> , meaning a less profit through technical innovation, may happen due to two 
reasons. One is the initial investment, namely that the acquisition cost. The increased return of the 
enterprise through technical innovation cannot cover the initial acquisition cost. The other is lending 
interest. The enterprise has to assume a large interest for a large loaning scale or a not enough low-
interest rate. Thus, to stimulate the enterprise to implement technical innovation, the appropriate 
loaning scales, leading to an increased profit Lπ π> , should be focused on. 
For environmental protection and sustainable development, the government stimulates green 
innovation through effective approaches. The government subsidy for green innovation projects is 
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considered in this paper. It has been proved by [33] that the government subsidy is an effective 
approach to stimulate green innovation, but there is no information on the subsidy scales. The 
problem on the government subsidy scales will be addressed in the following argument. With the 
objective to stimulate green innovation and green production, two kinds of government subsidy are 
involved in this paper, subsidy for the enterprise and subsidy for the bank. The enterprise needs 
financial support if it carries out technical innovation to improve energy efficiency. The bank 
provides capital for the green innovation project by issuing green loans with low-interest rates. To 
encourage the bank issuing green loan with a low-interest rate, the government provides subsidies 
for the bank. The enterprise expects a higher profit through technical innovation. However, as 
explained in the last paragraph, technical innovation cannot guarantee a higher profit. The enterprise 
might lose the confidence to implement innovation. Thus, to stimulate green innovation and improve 
environmental quality, the government subsidizes the enterprise if it decides to improve energy 
efficiency through technological innovation. Furthermore, the subsidy for the enterprise is divided 
into two parts, subsidies before and after technical innovation. Denote the subsidy scale for the bank 
by BS . If the bank issues the green loan for the green innovation project, then the government 
provides the subsidy with the scale BS  for the bank. On the other hand, denote the subsidy scales 
for the enterprise before the technical innovation and after the technical innovation by EbS  and 
E
aS  
respectively. Recall the profit function (4), the profit of the enterprise with government subsidy before 
implementing the technical innovation is written as 
2
0, E Eb bL S L S
M M M C rLπ ρκθ α β
+
= − − − −  
If the enterprise received the government subsidy before the technical innovation, the subsidy 
is involved in the investment of the innovation project, which leads to a further improvement of 
energy efficiency. The profit of the enterprise with government subsidy after implementing technical 
innovation is written as 
2
0, Ea
E
L aL S
M M M C rL Sπ ρκθ α β= − − − − +  
The subsidy is added to the profit of the enterprise directly. Apparently, both these two ways of 
government subsidy will increase the profit of the enterprise. However, with the same subsidy scales, 
it is difficult to determine which way of subsidy will lead to a higher profit for the enterprise. It might 
depend on each model parameter, as well as the loaning scale and interest rate. If necessary, these 
two ways of government subsidy can be provided together to stimulate the green innovation project 
of the enterprise. 
With the objective to stimulate green innovation and implement green production, basing on the 
models constructed above, in this paper, we consider three problems. Firstly, what loaning scale can 
lead to a higher profit of the enterprise. The enterprise improves energy efficiency through technical 
innovation, which results in a higher return. However, the enterprise should notice the lending 
interest results in a higher cost. The enterprise is willing to implement technical innovation as long 
as it can get a higher profit. From (4), we can see that the profit function of the enterprise depends 
heavily on the scale of the capital input. Secondly, what loaning scale can realize the green effect of 
the innovation. Although technical innovation can improve the energy efficiency of the enterprise, it 
will cause an increase in energy input and then an increase in energy emission. Thus, technical 
innovation may not show a green effect. We believe that there should be an appropriate loaning scale 
leading to green innovation. Thirdly, what government subsidy scale can stimulate green innovation. 
The government implements environmental protection and sustainable development through 
effective approaches. The government subsidy is an effective approach to stimulate green innovation. 
The subsequent problem concentrates on the subsidy scales. The government expects to provide 
subsidies with appropriate scales. 
3. Interest Rate and Green Loan Scale 
Green innovation needs financial support. The bank provides green loans for the enterprise to 
implement technical innovation. According to the baseline models constructed in Section 2, the 
technical innovation depends heavily on the loaning scale, as well as the lending interest rate. In this 
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section, with the objective to stimulate the green innovation project, we explore problems on the 
green loaning scales and the lending interest rate. For instance, the enterprise would like to achieve 
an increase in profit through technical innovation. The bank issues green loans to support green 
innovation. The green effect of the innovation project lies on the loaning scale. Meanwhile, the 
lending interest rate is also an important factor in stimulating green innovation. In general, green 
loan admits a low-interest rate. Some threshold of the lending interest rate is derived in this section. 
3.1. Conventional Production Mode 
We first consider the conventional production mode of the enterprise, regarded as the 
benchmark in the decision on the technical innovation project, as well as the loaning scale. According 
to the profit function in conventional production mode (3), the enterprise maximizes the derivative 
of profit as the marginal profit with respect to the energy input equals to zero, namely that 
0
0= 2 0MM
π ρκθ α β∂ − − =
∂
 
from which we can solve the optimal energy input as 
* 0
0 2
M ρκθ αβ
−
=  
Since α  is the unit energy price, in practice, it should be much lower than the price of the final 
product ρ . In addition, the production efficiency satisfies 1κ > . Hence, the optimal energy input is 
indeed larger than zero, which is consistent with the practice and acknowledged in the following 
argument. With this optimal scale of energy input, the maximum profit of the enterprise is given as 
( )20*
0 04
C
ρκθ α
π β
−
= −  
In conventional production, the effect made by the enterprise on the environment is given as 
( ) ( )( )0 0* *0 0 0 11 2E M
θ ρκθ αθ β
− −
= − =  
The profit is proportional to the square of the energy efficiency. Higher energy efficiency leads 
to a higher profit of the enterprise. The environmental effect through technical innovation is concave 
with respect to energy efficiency. It is easy to see that the enterprise makes the most negative effect 
on the environment when energy efficiency satisfies 0 1/ 2 / 2θ α ρκ= + . 
3.2. Green Innovation with Green Loan 
The enterprise pursues a higher profit. The motivation driving the enterprise to apply for a loan 
and implement technical innovation is the increase in profit after implementing the innovation. The 
profit function through technical innovation (4) depends heavily on the loaning scale, as well as the 
lending interest rate. In this section, we derive some specific loaning scales, which play important 
roles in stimulating green innovation. 
This is a two-stage process. In the first stage, the enterprise applies for a loan from the bank with 
scale L . The loaning scale might be zero, which means the veto of the application. In the case of a 
zero loaning scale, the enterprise performs conventional production. In the second stage, the 
enterprise carries out green innovation and green production and then achieves the profit captured 
by (4). The process is addressed by a backward induction strategy. 
In the second stage, given the loaning scale, the enterprise selects the optimal energy input to 
maximize its profit. The optimal energy input satisfies the first-order condition 
2 0L L MM
π ρκθ α β∂ = − − =
∂
 
which can be solved as 
*
2
L
LM
ρκθ α
β
−
=  
With this input scale, the maximum profit is given as 
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( )2*
04
L
L C rL
ρκθ α
π β
−
= − −  
In the first stage, the decision-makers of the enterprise make a decision to apply for a loan with 
an expected scale. The expected loaning scale should guarantee an increase in profit, namely that 
* *
0Lπ π> . Comparing the difference between 
*
Lπ  and 
*
0π , one can get 
( ) ( )( ) 2* *0 0 01 14L L L Lπ π θ γβ
−
− = Φ + − , ( ) 3 2L AL BL CL DΦ = + + +  (5) 
where A , B , C  and D  satisfy 
2 2
04A rβγ θ= −  
( ) ( )( )( )0 0 0 0 0 08 1 1 2 8B r r Lγθ β γ θ θ κρ θ κρ α βγθ= − + − + − +
( ) ( ) ( )( )2 20 0 0 0 0 08 1 1 1 2L rβγθ γθ γ θ θ κρ θ κρ α= − + − + −  
( ) ( )( )0 0 02 2 1C rβ γ θ θ κρ α θ κρ= − + − −
( ) ( )( )( )20 0 0 0 0 0 02 4 2 1 1 2L r r Lγθ β γθ κρ α θ θ κρ βγθ+ + − + − −  
( ) ( )( ) ( )20 0 0 0 0 0 0 02 1 ( 1 2 ) 4 1L L rγ θ θ κρ α θ κρ γθ θ κρ α β γθ= − − + + − − −  
and 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )0 0 0 0 0 0 01 2 1 2D L Lγ θ θ κρ α θ κρ γθ θ κρ α= − − + + −  
respectively. From (5), it is easy to see that 
( ) ( ) 2* *0 3arg max arg max 3LL L
B B ACL
A
π π
− + −
− = Φ =  
and 
( ) ( )2 2 2 2* *0 22 9 27 6 2 3max 27LL
B ABC A D AC B B AC
A
π π
− + + − −
− =  
Letting ( )* *0max 0L Lπ π− = , one can get 
2 2 3 3 2 24 18 4 27 0B C B D ABCD AC A D− + − + + =  (6) 
Recalling the formulas of A , B , C  and D , (6) is equivalent to 
( ) 3 2
0 0 0 0 0f r A r B r C r D= + + + = , (7) 
where 
( ) ( )2 33 3 2 2 30 0 0 0 0768 1 1A Lβ γ κ ρ θ θ γ θ= − − −  
( ) ( )( )( )22 4 2 2 4 2 20 0 0 0 0 0 048 1 4 20 3 4 6 5B H Jβ γ κ ρ θ θ α ακρ κ ρ θ κρ α κρ κρθ= − − − + + + − + +  
( ) ( )( )35 3 3 5 2 2 20 0 0 0 048 1 4 8C M Nβγ κ ρ θ θ α α ακρ κ ρ= − − − − + + +  
( ) ( ) ( )4 2 26 4 4 60 0 0 0 012 1 2D γ κ ρ θ θ α κρθ κρ κρθ α= − − − + −  
( )( )2 2 2 2 20 0 0 0 04 4 2 3 2H Lγ θ α ακρ κ ρ κρθ κρθ α= + − + −  
( )( )2 2 20 0 0 04 2 5 3 2 3J Lγ α ακρ κ ρ κρθ κρθ α κρ= − − + + − −  
( )( )2 2 20 0 0 04 14 3 2M κρθ α ακρ κ ρ κρθ α κρ κρθ= − + + + −  
and 
( ) ( )( )2 2 20 0 0 0 0 02 2 2 3 2N Lγ θ α κρ κρθ α ακρ κ ρ κρθ κρθ α= − − − + − + −  
One can solve a threshold of the lending interest rate as 
3 3
0
0
03
B
r
A
φ φ+ −− − −
=  (8) 
where 
( )2 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 93 3 2
A D B CB A C B Aφ+ − + Λ= − +  
Energies 2019, 12, 4431 11 of 22 
 
( )2 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 93 3 2
A D B CB A C B Aφ
−
− − Λ
= − +  
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 09 4 3 3B C A D B A C C B DΛ = − − − −  
Figure 3 presents the tendency of the profit gap * *0Lπ π−  with respect to the loaning scale L , 
where the initial energy efficiency 0 0.2θ = , the production efficiency 2κ = , the unit price of the 
final product 1ρ = , the unit price of energy input 0.1α = , the cost coefficient 0.001β = , the initial 
capital input 0 1000L = , the technical maturity 0.001γ = . Accordingly, the polynomial ( )LΦ  and 
( )f r  are calculated as 
( ) ( )10 3 6 10 21.6 10 1.28 10 1.408 10L rL r L− − −Φ = − × + − × + × ( )58.96 10 0.00256 0.0512r L−+ − × − −  
and 
( ) 3 226843.5 419.43 117.105 7.30816 0f r r r r= − + − =  
from which we can solve the threshold of the interest rate as 0 0.0468r = . If the lending interest rate 
satisfies 0 0.0468r = , then the profit gap * *0Lπ π−  is tangent with the zero line at some loaning scale, 
where the profit gap touches the maximum. Thus, if the lending interest rate satisfies 0.0468r ≥ , 
then for any loaning scale, it always holds that * *0Lπ π≤ , namely that technical innovation cannot 
bring higher profit for the enterprise than conventional production. If the lending interest rate 
satisfies 0.0468r < , then from Figure 2, we can know that there exist two loaning scales, whose 
formulas are given as 
1 2L L L+ = ∨ , 1 2L L L− = ∧  (9) 
where 
( )2
1
3 cos 3 sin
3
B B ACL
A
− + − Θ + Θ
=  
( )2
2
3 cos 3 sin
3
B B ACL
A
− + − Θ − Θ
=  
( ) ( )
( )
2
2 2
1 2 3 3 9arccos
3 3 3 3
B AC B A BC AD
B AC B AC
− − −Θ =
− −
 
 
Figure 3. The profit gap * *0Lπ π−  with respect to the loaning scale. The red line depicts the case 
where the lending interest rate r  is smaller than the threshold 0r . The blue line depicts the case 
where the lending interest rate r  equals to the threshold 0r . The green line depicts the case where 
the lending interest rate r  is larger than the threshold 0r . 
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If the loaning scale L  satisfies L L L
− +< < , then it holds that * *0Lπ π> , which means that the 
enterprise can achieve an increase in profit through technical innovation. Otherwise, it holds that 
* *
0Lπ π≤ . The technical innovation cannot increase the profit of the enterprise. We set the values of 
the model parameters as above, namely that 0 0.2θ = , 2κ = , 1ρ = , 0.1α = , 0.001β = , 0 1000L = , 
0.001γ = . Then, we set the lending interest rate 0.04 0.0468r = < . Accordingly, L+ , L−  are 
calculated as 11,277L+ = , 2963L− = , namely that if the lending interest rate is 0.04, then the loaning 
scale between 2963 and 11,277 can stimulate the enterprise to implement technical innovation. By 
summarizing the above quantitative analysis, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. If the lending interest rate is smaller than the threshold given in (8), then there exist 
two specific loaning scales given in (9). If the loaning scale received by the enterprise from the bank 
is between these two loaning scales given in (9), then the enterprise can achieve an increase in the 
profit through technical innovation. Thus, the green innovation project can be stimulated. Otherwise, 
if the loaning scale received by the enterprise is outside of the range between the two loaning scales 
given in (9), the enterprise fails to achieve an increase of the profit through technical innovation. If 
the lending interest rate is larger than the threshold given in (8), then the enterprise fails to achieve 
an increase of the profit through technical innovation with any loaning scale. 
Firstly, the incentive for green innovation depends on the lending interest rate. In general, the 
current funding level of the enterprise cannot well support the technical innovation project. Hence, 
the enterprise has to apply for a loan from the bank. Since pursuing profit is always the objective of 
the enterprise, a high lending interest rate might increase the cost of innovation such that the 
enterprise fails to achieve an increase in profit. Thus, the high lending interest rate goes against the 
incentive of green innovation. An appropriate lending interest rate should be focused on. Proposition 
1 provides a threshold of the lending interest rate as a benchmark. The lending interest rate for the 
enterprise should be lower than the given threshold such that the green innovation will be stimulated. 
If the lending interest rate is higher than the threshold, the enterprise has to pay an overlarge cost of 
innovation such that it is impossible to get a higher profit than the conventional production. 
Secondly, supposing that the lending interest rate for the enterprise is lower than the threshold 
in Proposition 1, the incentive of green innovation also depends on the loaning scale. Proposition 
1indicates that even though the lending interest rate is lower than the given threshold, the enterprise 
still cannot guarantee a higher profit through green innovation. Furthermore, it is determined by the 
loaning scale. From Proposition 1, if the loaning scale received by the enterprise is between the two 
given specific scales, the enterprise can return a higher profit than conventional production through 
green innovation. Otherwise, it fails to increase profit. Therefore, an appropriate loaning scale should 
be focused on as well when stimulating green innovation. Both the appropriate lending interest rate 
and appropriate loaning scale will succeed to stimulate the green innovation. 
3.3. Green Loan Improving Environmental Effect 
The objective of the green loan is to improve the environmental effect of some production and 
innovation activities. It should play an important role in supporting green projects. In this paper, the 
bank provides capital for the enterprise to carry out the green innovation project and improve energy 
efficiency by issuing green loans. The improvement of energy efficiency will reduce energy emission 
and improve environmental quality. Meanwhile, the improvement of energy efficiency will lead to 
larger energy input. As a result of larger energy emission, it is adverse to the environment. According 
to the measure of environmental effect (1), the loaning scale plays a key role in controlling the energy 
emission. Hence, an appropriate loaning scale in stimulating green innovation not only increases the 
profit of the enterprise but also improves the environmental quality. In this section, we focus on the 
green loaning scale. The environmental effect made by the enterprise which implements green 
innovation with a loaning scale L  is measured by 
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( ) ( )( )0 0* * 11
2L L L
E M
θ ρκθ αθ β
− −
= − =  
for 0L L≤  and 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0* *
2
0 0
1
1
2 1
L L L
L L L
E M
L L
θ ρκθ ρκθ γ α αγθ ρκθ γ αθ γ
θ β γθ
− − − + + −
= − =
+ −
 
for 0L L> . With the objective to improve the environmental effect of the enterprise, an appropriate 
green loaning scale should guarantee the relation * *0LE E< . Comparing the difference between 
*
LE  
and *0E  gives 
( ) ( )( ) 2* * 00 0 01 12LE E L L L
θ γθβ
−−
− = Ψ + − , ( ) 2L aL bL cΨ = + + , 0L L>  
where 
( )2 20 0a γ θ α κρθ= −  
( )( )0 0 0 0 02 2b Lγθ α κρ κρθ γθ θ κρ α= + − + −  
( ) ( )( )0 0 0 0 0 01 2c L Lγθ α θ κρ γθ ρκθ α= − + − + −  
If the original energy efficiency satisfies 0 1/ 2 / 2θ α ρκ< + , then we can solve a loaning scale by 
letting * *0 0LE E− = , whose formula is given as 
( ) ( )
( )
0 0 0 0 0*
0 0
2 2 1 2
2
L
L
α κρ κρθ γθ ρκθ α α θ κρ
γθ κρθ α
+ − + − + + −
=
−
 (10) 
In this case, if the loaning scale satisfies *L L> , then the environmental effect satisfies * *0LE E< . 
If the loaning scale satisfies *0L L L< < , then the environmental effect satisfies 
* *
0LE E> . On the other 
hand, if the original energy efficiency satisfies 0 1/ 2 / 2θ α ρκ≥ + , then it is easy to understand that 
any loaning scale larger than the initial capital input 0L  can guarantee the relation * *0LE E< . Figures 
4 and 5 show the tendency of the environmental effect *LE  depending on the loaning scale L . The 
model parameters are set to be 0.1α = , 0.001β = , 0.001γ = , 2κ = , 1ρ = , 0 1000L = . Thus, 
1/ 2 / 2 0.525α ρκ+ = . In Figure 4, the original energy efficiency is set to be 0 0.3 0.525θ = < . Then the 
threshold of loaning scale *L exists, satisfying * 7000L = . We can see that for 7000L > , it holds that 
* *
0LE E< , the red part of the line in Figure 3. In Figure 5, the original energy efficiency is set to be 
0 0.7 0.525θ = > . Thus, any loaning scale larger than 0L  will lead to * *0LE E< . Summarizing the above 
quantitative analysis, we have the following proposition.
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Figure 4. The tendency of the environmental effect *LE  with respect to the loaning scale. The original 
energy efficiency is set to be 0 0.3θ = . The red part means that the environmental effect satisfies 
* *
0LE E< . The blue part means that the environmental effect satisfies 
* *
0LE E≥ . 
 
Figure 5. The tendency of the environmental effect *LE  with respect to the loaning scale. The original 
energy efficiency is set to be 0 0.7θ = . The red part means that the environmental effect satisfies 
* *
0LE E< . The blue part means that the environmental effect satisfies 
* *
0LE E≥ . 
Proposition 2. If the original energy efficiency is lower than the specific value 1/ 2 / 2α ρκ+ , then 
there exists a threshold of the loaning scale given in (10). If the loaning scale received by the enterprise 
is larger than this threshold, then the energy emission can be reduced through the green innovation 
and the environmental effect made by the enterprise is improved. If the loaning scale is smaller than 
the threshold, then more energy emission comes into being due to the technical innovation and the 
environmental effect made by the enterprise becomes worse than conventional production. If the 
original energy efficiency is higher than the specific value 1/ 2 / 2α ρκ+ , then besides the initial 
acquisition cost of equipment, with any loaning scale for the green innovation, the environmental 
effect made by the enterprise can be improved. 
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The enterprise with a lower original energy efficiency needs a larger loaning scale to improve 
the environmental effect through green innovation. On the contrary, if the enterprise admits a high 
original energy efficiency, then a small loaning scale can improve the environmental effect. Firstly, 
Proposition 2 indicates that if the original energy efficiency of the enterprise is larger than some 
specific value, then any loaning scale larger than the initial capital input can improve the 
environmental effect of the enterprise. Otherwise, some appropriate loaning scale should be needed 
to show the green effect. Secondly, Proposition 2 presents a threshold of the green loaning scale, 
following the case where the original energy efficiency of the enterprise is smaller than the given 
specific value. If the loaning scale received by the enterprise is larger than the threshold given in 
Proposition 2, then the technical innovation project can show the green effect on the environment. 
Otherwise, the technical innovation fails to be a green project. 
Associating the results in Proposition 1 with Proposition 2, some suggestions on the green 
loaning scale stimulating the enterprise to implement green innovation are summarized as follows. 
Firstly, if the original energy efficiency of the enterprise is smaller than the specific value 
1/ 2 / 2α ρκ+ , and in addition, the threshold scale *L given in (10) lies between the scales L+  and 
L
−
 given in (9), then a loaning scale larger than the threshold *L but smaller than the upper scale 
L+  is appropriate. Thus, the scale between scale L+  and L−  not only increases the profit of the 
enterprise but also improves the environmental quality. 
Secondly, if the original energy efficiency of the enterprise is higher than the specific value 
1/ 2 / 2α ρκ+ , then any loaning scale between the scales L+  and L−  given in (9) is appropriate. 
Moreover, from the viewpoint of green production, a loaning scale between L+  and L−  but close 
to L+  is more preferred, since it will result in better environmental effect. 
Thirdly, if the original energy efficiency of the enterprise is lower than the specific value 
1/ 2 / 2α ρκ+  and the threshold scale given in (10) is lower than the scale L
−
 given in (9), then a 
scale of loan close to the scale L+  is more preferred as well. 
Fourthly, if the original energy efficiency of the enterprise is lower than the specific value and 
the threshold scale given in (10) is higher than the scale L+  given in (9), then there does not exist an 
appropriate loaning scale to improve the environmental effect of the enterprise. In this case, the 
government subsidy should play an important role, which will be discussed in the following section. 
4. Government Subsidy Scale 
The government works on environmental protection and sustainable development through 
effective approaches. In this paper, following the work of Huang et al. [33], the government subsidy 
is still considered as an approach to stimulate green innovation. They showed that the government 
subsidy is effective to stimulate green innovation and improve environmental quality. However, the 
government subsidy scale is unclear. In this section, we focus on the government subsidy scale. The 
enterprise and the bank are two primary participants in the green innovation activity. The 
corporation between the enterprise and the bank guarantees the implementation of the green 
innovation project. Thus, if necessary, the government should provide subsidies for both the 
enterprise and the bank. 
4.1. Government Subsidy for the Bank 
The bank provides capital for the green innovation project. Usually, green loans require low 
lending interest rates relative to general commercial loans, which may weaken the willingness of the 
bank to issue green loans. Proposition 1 shows that if the lending interest rate is higher than the 
threshold given in (8), the green innovation cannot be stimulated since the enterprise fails to return 
a larger profit through green innovation than conventional production. Thus, to stimulate green 
innovation, a relatively low lending interest rate is preferred. The government encourages the bank 
to issue green loans with low lending interest rates by providing subsidies. An example of interest 
rate subsidy is provided by the Bank of China’s suggestion of strengthening interest rate discounts 
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in green loans [53]. Also, the government may lower the interest rates by the direct open market 
operation of offering partial or total guarantees for the loan. Green loans have a 15 years average 
maturity, the market increased by 30% from 2017 to 2018. According to the 2019 NGFS report [54], 
financial risk of green loan default is at 5.7% while non-green loans are at 8.5%, which will encourage 
a positive trend regarding risk-averse lenders.  
Denote the practical lending interest rate for the enterprise by r . The loaning scale received by 
the enterprise from the bank is denoted by L . According to Proposition 1, the premise that green 
innovation can be successfully stimulated is that the lending interest rate r  satisfies ˆr r< , where 
rˆ  is the threshold given in (8). Otherwise, innovation fails to be stimulated. Thus, to encourage the 
issue of green loan, if the bank approves the lending interest rate lower than the threshold in (8), the 
government subsidizes the bank with a scale 
( )ˆBS r r L= −  (11) 
We summarize the discussion as the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. If the bank approves the green loan for the enterprise with the interest rate lower than 
the threshold given in (8), then the bank will receive a subsidy from the government. The subsidy 
scale is the difference between the lending interest with the threshold interest rate in (8) and the 
practical interest from the enterprise, i.e., (11). The government compensates for the possible potential 
loss of the bank due to the issue of green loans with a low-interest rate such that green innovation 
can be stimulated. 
4.2. Government Subsidy for the Enterprise 
Proposition 1 indicates that the incentive of green innovation depends both on the interest rate 
and the green loaning scale. This results from the objective of the enterprise, pursuing a higher profit. 
The government encourages the bank to issue green loans with low-interest rates by providing 
subsidies such that the lending interest rate could be lower than the threshold given in (8). The 
subsidy scale for the bank has been discussed in the last subsection. In this subsection, we pay our 
attention to the subsidy for the enterprise. We have the precondition that the government has 
subsidies for the bank and the lending interest rate for the enterprise is lower than the threshold given 
in (8). Thus, the incentive for green innovation relies on the loaning scale. 
With the objective of environmental protection and sustainable development, the government 
would like to stimulate the enterprise to implement green innovation improving energy efficiency. 
According to Proposition 2, the environmental effect of the innovation activity also depends on the 
loaning scale. If the relation 0 1/2 + /2θ α ρκ≥  holds, then any loaning scale larger than the initial 
capital input 0L  can lead to a positive environmental effect, i.e., * *0LE E< . For this case, if the 
practical loaning scale L  received by the enterprise is smaller than the threshold scale L
−
 given 
in (9), then the government subsidies the enterprise before implementing the technical innovation 
with a scale EbS  larger than the threshold 
*E
bS L L−= −  (12) 
If the loaning scale L  received by the enterprise is between the scales L
−
 and L+  in (9), then 
the government does not need to provide a subsidy for the enterprise. If the loaning scale L  is larger 
than the scale L+  in (9), then the government subsidizes the enterprise after the technical innovation 
with a scale EbS  larger than the threshold 
* * *E
a L LS π π+= −  (13) 
that is, the government compensates the enterprise due to the cost of excessive loans. Now we 
consider the case that the original energy efficiency satisfies 0 <1/2 + /2θ α ρκ . If the loaning scale 
received by the enterprise L , the thresholds scales L
−
, L+  given in (9) and 
*L  given in (10) satisfy 
Energies 2019, 12, 4431 17 of 22 
 
the relation *L L L L
− +< < <  or 
*L L L L
− +< < < , then the government should provide a subsidy for 
the enterprise before implementing the technical innovation larger than the threshold 
* *E
bS L L= −  (14) 
Comparting the difference between the profit with government subsidy before the technical 
innovation * ,L Sπ  and the profit of conventional production 
*
0π , where the profit with a subsidy 
*
,L Sπ  is given as 
( )2*
, 04
L S
L S C rL
ρκθ α
π β
+ −
= − −  
one can solve the quantity S  as 
( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0
0 0
L L H H L L
S
H
θ θ γ θ γ
θ γ θ γ
+ − − − −
=
−
 
where 
( )202 rLH β ρκθ α α
ρκ
+ − +
=  
If the relation *L L L
−
< <  holds, then the government should provide a subsidy for the 
enterprise before the technical innovation with a scale larger than *EbS S= . Alternatively, the 
government could provide a subsidy for the enterprise after the technical innovation with a scale 
larger than * * *Ea L LS π π
−
= − . In this case, the government determine the threshold of subsidy scale as 
( )* * * * *E E Eb a L LS S S S π π
−
= ∧ = ∧ −  (15) 
If the relation *L L L
−
< <  holds, then the government could provide a subsidy for the enterprise 
before the technical innovation with a scale larger than ( )* *EbS L L S= − ∨ . Alternatively, the 
government could first provide a subsidy for the enterprise before the technical innovation with scale 
(larger than) * *EbS L L= −  and then provide another subsidy after the technical innovation with a 
scale larger than ** * *Ea L LS π π−= − . Hence, in this case, the government may determine the threshold of 
subsidy scale as 
( )( ) ( )** * * * *E L LS L L S L L π π−= − ∨ ∧ − + −  (16) 
If the relation *L L L+< <  holds, then the government could first provide a subsidy for the 
enterprise before the technical innovation with a scale larger than * *EbS L L= − . Then the government 
provides another subsidy for the enterprise after the technical innovation with a scale larger than 
*
* * *E
a L L
S π π
+
= − . Hence, in this case, the government may determine the threshold of subsidy scale as 
*
* * * *E
L L
S L L π π
+
= − + −  (17) 
We summarize the discussion in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4. If the original energy efficiency of the enterprise is higher than the specific value 
1/ 2 / 2α ρκ+ , then we have the following strategy for the decision of the government subsidy. If the 
practical loaning scale received by the enterprise is lower than the small scale L
−
 given in (9), then 
to stimulate the green innovation, the government should provide a subsidy for the enterprise before 
the technical innovation larger than the threshold given in (12). If the practical loaning scale received 
by the enterprise is higher than the large scale L+  given in (9), the government should provide a 
subsidy for the enterprise after the technical innovation larger than the threshold given in (13). 
If the original energy efficiency of the enterprise is lower than the specific value 1/ 2 / 2α ρκ+ , 
then we have the following strategy for the decision of the government subsidy. Firstly, if the 
threshold scale given in (10) is between the two scales given in (9) meanwhile, the practical loaning 
scale received by the enterprise is lower than the threshold scale in (10), then to stimulate the green 
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innovation, the government should provide a subsidy for the enterprise larger than the threshold 
given in (14). Secondly, if the threshold scale in (10) is lower than the small scale L
−
 in (9) 
meanwhile, the practical loaning scale received by the enterprise is between the threshold scale in (10) 
and the small scale L
−
 in (9), then the government should provide the subsidy for the enterprise 
larger than the threshold given in (15). Thirdly, if the threshold scale in (10) is lower than the small 
scale L
−
 in (9) meanwhile, the practical loaning scale received by the enterprise is lower than the 
threshold scale in (10), then the government should provide the subsidy for the enterprise larger than 
the threshold given in (16). Fourthly, if the threshold scale in (10) is beyond the large scale L+  in (9) 
and the practical loaning scale received by the enterprise is lower than large scale L+  in (9), then 
the government should provide the subsidy for the enterprise larger than the threshold given in (17). 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, three participants, the enterprise, the bank, and the government, are involved in 
the green innovation decision. The enterprise, which is supposed to be a profit seeker, plays a 
principal role. This is different from most existing literature, where the role of the enterprise is 
subordinate. In our setting, the energy-intensive enterprise would like to increase the profit through 
technical innovation, improving energy efficiency. The technical innovation is beneficial to the 
environment and hence, is green. The financing way is applying for loans from the bank. The bank 
evaluates the application and makes a decision on the approval of the green loans. To stimulate green 
innovation development, the government provides necessary subsidies for the enterprise or the bank. 
We recall the objective of the paper looking for appropriate loaning scales, interest rate and subsidy 
scales in the green innovation performance. The appropriateness means that the innovation activity 
should be stimulated and the innovation should be green with these financial resources. By 
constructing series of models according to game theory and taking analysis, we achieve some useful 
results as follows. 
The stimulation of the technical innovation improving energy efficiency is captured by a two-
step strategy. In the first step, the innovation stimulation depends on the lending interest rate. In 
Proposition 1, we present a threshold of the lending interest rate. If the lending interest rate exceeds 
this threshold, then the enterprise will not implement the green innovation project improving its 
energy efficiency, since the innovation cost is higher than the return after innovating. Thus, the 
enterprise cannot increase its profit by technical innovation project and the innovation cannot be 
stimulated. On the other hand, if the lending interest rate is lower than the threshold, then the green 
innovation stimulation turns into the second step. In the second step, following that the lending 
interest rate is lower than the given threshold in the first step, the innovation stimulation depends on 
the green loaning scale. In Proposition 1, we present two thresholds of loaning scale. If the loaning 
scale for the innovation project lies between these two threshold scales, then the enterprise can 
increase its profit by technical innovation and thus the green innovation can be stimulated. Otherwise, 
green innovation fails to be stimulated. If the loaning scale for the innovation project is lower than 
the small threshold scale, it means that the capital investment is lacking and the profit increase is not 
remarkable. If the loaning scale for the innovation project exceeds the large threshold scale, it means 
that excessive capital investment leads to high pressure of debt repayment, which results in the profit 
decrease. Summarily, as the enterprise is the principal role in the green innovation activity in this 
paper, hence, from the viewpoint of the enterprise, if, and only if, the lending interest rate is lower 
than the given threshold and the loaning scale lies between the two threshold scales, the green 
innovation can be stimulated.  
The green effects of technical innovation also depend on the loaning scale. Green innovation and 
green loans should show their green effects on the environment. The improvement of energy 
efficiency through technical innovation might lead to more energy input, which results in more 
energy emission into the environment. Thus, the innovation might lose its green effect. In this paper, 
to prevent this event, we have the following consequence, according to Proposition 2. If the original 
energy efficiency is larger than some specific value related to unit prices of energy input and final 
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product, and the production efficiency (see Proposition 2), then any loaning scale for the technical 
innovation larger than the initial acquisition cost will lead to a reduction of emission from the 
enterprise. Thus, technical innovation shows a green effect. However, if the original energy efficiency 
is lower than the specific value, then the green effect of innovation depends on the loaning scale. In 
Proposition 2, we present another threshold of loaning scale. If the loaning scale for the innovation 
project exceeds this threshold scale, then the emission from the enterprise will be reduced after 
technical innovation. The technical innovation and the loan show their green effects on the 
environment. If the loaning scale for technical innovation is lower than the given threshold scale, then 
the emission from the enterprise increases after technical innovation. Thus, the technical innovation, 
as well as the loan, cannot show any green effect. Summarily, an energy-intensive enterprise with 
lower original energy efficiency needs an adequate investment to improve its energy efficiency and 
realize the green effect of the innovation. On the contrary, an energy-intensive enterprise with higher 
original energy efficiency only needs a moderate investment to realize the green innovation. 
Associating with those two thresholds of loaning scale in Proposition 1, these three thresholds of 
loaning scale should play important roles in green innovation decisions. They provide valuable 
references for the enterprise and the bank when making decisions on the application for loans to 
implement technical innovation or evaluating the innovation loans. Some appropriate loaning scales 
in the green innovation performance can be determined by taking the analysis of the comparison 
among these three threshold scales (see the analysis behind Proposition 2). We have to emphasize 
that there exists a special case, that the threshold scale in Proposition 2 might be larger than the large 
threshold scale in Proposition 1. This leads to a result that there does not exist any appropriate loaning 
scale in the green innovation decision. To fit this case, government subsidy is introduced and shows 
its effectiveness. 
Government subsidy is an effective approach to stimulate green innovation. The effectiveness is 
embodied through the subsidy scales. Three forms of government subsidy are considered in the 
paper, including a subsidy for the bank issuing green loans, subsidy for the enterprise before green 
innovation, and subsidy for the enterprise after green innovation. In general, green loans are 
accompanied by low-interest rates. The government compensates for the possible potential loss for 
the bank due to the issue of green loans with a low-interest rate. In this paper, the subsidy scale for 
the bank from the government is determined according to Proposition 3. It is the difference between 
the lending interest with the threshold rate and the practical interest of the enterprise. For the 
enterprise, the subsidy strategy is a little complicated, since it is dependent on the relations among 
the three thresholds of loaning scale in Propositions 1 and 2. If the government subsidizes the 
enterprise before implementing innovation projects, the subsidy will be invested in the innovation 
project such that the enterprise has more initial capital. Differently, if the government subsidizes the 
enterprise after implementing innovation project, the subsidy is a pure addition to the profit of the 
enterprise. The government subsidy strategy is summarized in Proposition 4. We conclude that the 
subsidy strategy is a branching tree pattern. The first branching depends on the original energy 
efficiency of the enterprise and the second branching depends on the loaning scale. The government 
subsidy strategy can provide policymakers with some auxiliary suggestions on the subsidy ways and 
subsidy scales. According to our government subsidy strategy, the government can provide 
appropriate loaning scales for the bank and the enterprise through appropriate ways to stimulate 
green innovation.  
In this paper, we focus on appropriate loaning scales and interest rates, as well as appropriate 
government subsidy scales in green innovation development. Some explicit formulas of loaning 
scales and interest rates, government subsidy scales are derived, which may provide some valuable 
references and suggestions for the green innovation stimulation and performance. We achieve these 
results through constructing game models according to game theory. The enterprise is the principal 
participant in the game, who is supposed to be completely profit-driven. Hence, the utility function 
is governed by profit. In general, green innovation is accompanied by high risk. The effect of green 
innovation shows uncertainty. Thus, when making a decision on the green innovation project, the 
enterprise should consider the innovation risk. The utility function is governed not only by the profit 
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but also by the innovation risk. Both the bank and the government should also care for the risk when 
stimulating green innovation. We believe that this uncertainty will affect the green loaning scales and 
interest rate, and the government subsidy scales, which can be embodied by the explicit formulas in 
our models. The innovation risk will be focused in our forthcoming work. Meanwhile, some empirical 
results will be involved. 
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